

# THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2004

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE RESTRUCTURING OF US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS, by MAJ Darrell W. Martin, 67 pages.

The Civil Affairs (CA) structure the Army now knows should cease to exist. From this current structure, the best and brightest CA noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers should be extracted to fill the slots in the newly recommended structure. In the recommendation, there will be no reserve component (RC) CA units. CA NCOs and officers will be on the S, G, C, or J5 staffs. There will only be RC individual military augmentees (IMAs).

Every maneuver company level unit in the Army will send two NCOs per platoon to a two, three or four week CA course in order to train combat arms maneuver soldiers to perform basic assessments. The first sergeant will also attend this course. The first sergeant will consolidate and verify these assessments and forward them to the CA officer at battalion. For these NCOs, this CA designator creates a future possibility should he ever wish to become a CA NCO on a battalion, brigade, division, corps, or theater staff.

All of the CA positions at battalion and above are active component (AC), and permanently assigned to the maneuver units, with the exception of the CA specialists. CA specialists will be temporarily tasked to the maneuver units to perform a specific function. They may be RC or AC.

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## ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ANCOC	Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course
BNCOC	Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course
CA	Civil Affairs
CACOM	Civil Affairs Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMCC	Civil Military Coordination Center
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CTC	Combat Training Center
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
FM	Field Manual
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
IMA	Individual Military Augmentee
JP	Joint Publication
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NTC	National Training Center
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SF	Special Forces

SOCENT	Special Operations Command Central
SOF	Special Operations Forces
USACAPOC(A)	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
USASOC(A)	United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne)

## CHAPTER 1

### WHAT IS US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS?

#### According to Doctrine

In order to examine the possibilities for change within US Army civil affairs, it is important to first define the issue to more clearly state the problem. According to Joint and Army doctrine, what is civil affairs? Civil affairs is defined in Joint Publication 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, as the “Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations.”<sup>1</sup> Civil affairs is abbreviated as CA in most publications, to include Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Civil Affairs activities are defined by JP 3-57.1 as “Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.”<sup>2</sup> Civil Military Operations (CMO) are defined by JP3-57.1 as

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces or activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.<sup>3</sup>



Civil Affairs (CA) forces augment maneuver forces to accomplish the maneuver commander's mission. The maneuver commander, at any given level, is always responsible for the activities which occur within the area of operations (AO) that he has been assigned. CA activities are a small part of CMO. These activities are a vital part of CMO, but they should not be misconstrued as the entire civil military operation. This is important to note because that is exactly what often happens. By no fault of the maneuver commander, he is often faced with the choice of where to put his primary emphasis. He can either concentrate on combat operations, or on CMO, which are taking place in the combat zone. If this is a problem for a company commander, then it is ten times the problem for a brigade or division commander. With over 100 people in his charge, for example, a company commander cannot be omnipresent. It is a normal situation in which a team of CA soldiers find themselves doing the bulk of the CMO. This may not be a problem, and in fact, is often a successful arrangement, provided the CA team has adequate resources to complete the mission and an intimate knowledge of the maneuver commander's intent. Lack of resources is normally the problem, when problems arise.

Resources are always an issue for CA because they are a very lean organization to begin with. According to FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, "... RC (reserve component) units may not have the latest or AC (active component) equivalent equipment, as well as individual equipment items."<sup>4</sup> In fact none of the RC CA units have enough radios capable of communicating with AC unit's radios to allow them to operate without augmentation from the supported unit. Most maneuver units accept, as a price for having CA units that they will have to support them logistically at least in part.

To examine the specific size and composition of CA forces currently, one must start at the highest level of CA structure. There are four Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMS) in the army inventory. These contain sixteen functional skills. These functions are: public administration, public education, public safety, international law, public health, public transportation, public works and utilities, public communications, food and agriculture, economic development, civilian supply, emergency services, environmental management, cultural relations, civil information, and dislocated civilians. The CA brigade is the lowest level at which all sixteen functions can be found. There are twenty-five battalions of CA forces in the army inventory. Twenty-four of those are in the RC and one is in the AC. There are 159 soldiers in a CACOM. A CA Brigade contains 141 personnel. A CA Battalion comprises 142 people. These numbers are not congruent with the typical division, brigade or battalion of maneuver forces. For this reason it is imperative that CA planners stress to their supported commander that CA forces be used judiciously.<sup>5</sup>

When organized for combat, the CACOM becomes an augmentation to the combatant commander's staff. A CA brigade supports a maneuver corps in the same way. A CA battalion supports a maneuver division, and a direct support detachment (DS DET or sometimes a company dependent upon the situation) supports a brigade, regiment, or regimental combat team.<sup>6</sup>

In the AC of the Army, there is only one battalion of CA soldiers. All CA soldiers in the active army come out of the 96th CA Battalion. These soldiers habitually support the Special Operations Forces exclusively, though they may support conventional forces as well depending on the mission. The five companies are regionally oriented, as are the

Special Forces (SF) groups and the CACOMs, to the combatant command regions of the world. All noncommissioned officers on civil affairs A-teams (CAT-As) within the 96th CA Battalion (other than support) are Special Forces soldiers. That means they have had extensive schooling in civil military operations, insurgencies, counter-insurgencies, host nation support, regional orientation, language and a variety of other subjects, which will prepare them for CA operations. This distinction is not noted in the Joint Publications 3-57.1 or 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*. This is important not only because the higher standard for the quality of the soldiers at the tactical level in the AC should be recognized, but also because as mentioned previously, the schooling of these soldiers is very extensive and time consuming. Therefore, the number of these soldiers is not easily or quickly increased. Also, the lowest ranking soldier in an AC CAT-A is normally an E6. This is due to the fact that he cannot become a Special Forces soldier until he is at least an E5. Hence, there are normally more senior and more highly trained soldiers at the tactical level within the AC CA units. This is an important planning factor, which is not addressed in any doctrinal manuals, but the future of the 96th CA Battalion will be addressed later. It is easy to recognize that the CA forces, both AC and RC, are valuable and very limited commodities.

#### Common Misconceptions

It is important to address misconceptions to enable the maneuver forces to understand what CA cannot do as CMO is discussed. When planning for the use of CA forces, planners at all levels must remember what was mentioned above with regard to CA unit structure. There is a very limited number of CA soldiers in the units. That is, a CA brigade does not contain even a fraction of the soldiers that a maneuver brigade

contains. Also, the individual soldiers' level of training is not equal. There are specialists in language and culture and various government functions, but that is only at the brigade level and higher. The battalion and below contain only CA generalists who's level of expertise with regard to CMO is probably not any greater than the infantry squad leader whom he supports.

Many misconceptions exist in the active army about CA units. Most of these center around the idea that anything involving civilians should be a CA function. CA may have a role in these activities, but most are CMO activities and not CA activities. For example, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) control and management is a Military Police (MP) function. Many commanders make the assumption that since running an EPW camp has many of the same logistics considerations as running a refugee camp or a dislocated civilian (DC) camp, CA soldiers should be responsible. In fact, there is rarely an instance when an EPW control facility has any need for CA personnel. If CA personnel are required, the MP unit in charge of the EPW facility will coordinate with the CA unit for that support. There are many international laws and Geneva Convention requirements involved in EPW management. MPs and not CA soldiers are best trained to accomplish this task.<sup>7</sup>

Another area in which CA soldiers are not the force of choice is linguistic support to maneuver units. The specialty teams are located no lower than the brigade level. This means that in a maneuver battalion or below, there are no linguists available for tactical tasks. A maneuver commander may expect to see a CAT-A at battalion level. This means that if his battalion has been augmented with a CAT-A, he may see one or two soldiers at the company level. They are usually CA generalists who are somewhat familiar with the

culture and customs of the area, and can make assessments as to the state of the infrastructure in the companies sector. They may be able to suggest projects which the company or battalion could complete to help the locals and possibly the soldiers in the unit. Their primary task, however, is to complete their assessments and forward those both to the maneuver chain of command and to the CA chain of command, so that the CA battalion, brigade or CACOM can coordinate with the proper US Government agency, international organization (IO) or nongovernmental organization (NGO) to reestablish the infrastructure in an area of operations (AO) of US troops, be it officially occupied or not.

It is easy to see based on the numbers of CA forces available that CA soldiers are not going to be the sole agents engaging in the actual building or managing of DC camps. Just like EPW camps, DC camps are logistically very resource intensive. CA soldiers may have much more input to the building and managing of DC camps than of EPW camps, but these are still CMO tasks for which the maneuver commander has responsibility. The maneuver element should provide resources to conduct these activities when they are required to be performed by the military.

Oftentimes outsiders or even military personnel have the misconception that it is the job of the US Army to upgrade the standard of living of the occupied country to that of the US. This is simply not the case. The maneuver commander has neither the time, the resources nor the requirement to upgrade the living conditions of the locals to anything better than what they were before US soldiers occupied. According to international law the commander with responsibility over an area is obligated to minimize impact to the local populace as much as he can without degrading his military operation.<sup>8</sup>

The final misconception to be addressed is the problem of refugees. By definition, “a refugee is any person who is displaced from their home country or country of origin and due to real or perceived danger cannot return home.”<sup>9</sup> For army units, refugees are normally beyond the ability of their resources. Coordination will be made as soon as possible with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deal with a refugee problem. If it does not affect the maneuver commander’s mission and there are resources available, CA troops are not dissuaded from helping refugees. Normally refugees do not flee into a war zone, however, they flee out of the war zone. Therefore when US maneuver forces enter into an area, the refugees are normally leaving the area. Unless the refugee camp was there before the US forces arrived, in which case the CA forces should be coordinating with the UNHCR before the US forces arrive in country. For this reason refugees will normally only be dealt with when a CA unit is sent to a region specifically to deal with a refugee crisis. The reason that this delineation in terms is important is because there are different rules under the Geneva Convention for the host nation when dealing with refugees rather than the host nation’s own internally displaced persons or dislocated civilians.

### The History of Modern Civil Affairs

History shows that the US Army has been conducting CA activities since the US has been a country. Even so, modern CA activities are, in many ways, very different from what was done prior to World War II. Prior to World War II there were no CA soldiers, units or staffs, only regular maneuver forces performing civil affairs functions. Before 1941, there was much less global, or even international concern over the treatment of the local populace. The primary concern before World War II was that the armies who were

going to be working in a given area still had to coexist and operate alongside the natives of that area. During World War II, however, President Roosevelt realized that CA activities carried much larger implications. He saw that CA activities had strategic impacts sufficient to require the approval of the Office of the President.<sup>10</sup>

During World War II the War Department examined several historic CA operations performed by both the US Army and foreign armies up until that time. What they discovered was that the US Army was sorely under manned for the task of being the de facto government in the occupied areas, such as Germany and Japan. In order to address this issue in May 1942, in Charlottesville, Virginia, the War Department began the School for Military Government (later called the School for Civil Affairs and Military Government, or CA/MG). They worked through a number of problems with the school, most of which involved the inability to produce enough CA officers rapidly enough. The Provost Marshall's office determined that by the end of 1944 there would be a need for 6,000 CA officers in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). By the end of 1944 5900 CA officers had been through the school, and CA officers were beginning to be sent from other theaters such as North Africa to the ETO.<sup>11</sup>

The CA officers in World War II were the acting government for the territory that they occupied. The sixteen specialty functions in CA were developed as functions of a government to mirror the ministries that they were tasked to replace. For this reason, experts in local, state, and federal government functions were all employed in that same capacity within their theater of war. For example, the public transportation manager in Peoria Illinois may now be using local French labor augmented by US soldiers, to manage the public transportation assets in Paris, France. This is the model upon which

was built the CA structure that is still used today. In order to run a function of a city government a great deal of expertise and manpower would be required. Since US soldiers were managing all functions of city government, the reason is obvious for the structure of CA units being so large.

By the Korean War much of the CA expertise had been lost. Unlike Korea, during World War II, American society was mobilized for war. Everyone took part in one way or another. After World War II, there was a major demobilization of US society. Citizen soldiers went back to their civilian jobs. Even though the Korean war occurred only six years later, a study produced by the Operations Research Office (ORO), Johns Hopkins University, authored by Henry Kissinger and C. Darwin Stolzenbach (1952), reported many of the same problems and issues faced by the army of World War II. It stated that more officers with regional expertise and language skills were needed, and that they should be placed in the newly recommended G5 section of the General's staff (which did not exist at that time). The study concluded that a special staff for CA would be too large and cumbersome to be effective as well as losing much of the authority of the regular staff.<sup>12</sup> The major difference between the findings of this study and those of previous studies was that the CA officer was less autonomous and did not have as much influence in the government as the CA officers had in World War II. Specifically, the study said, "The conditions of civil affair in Korea can be summarized as follows: (a) The Army is conducting military operations in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations. (b) The Republic of Korea is treated as an independent, friendly, sovereign nation. Civil affairs functions can thus be exercised only through a de facto or de jure surrender of Korean sovereignty in certain areas. (c) Army civil affairs responsibility includes support of



military operations, prevention of disease and unrest to insure the security of troops, and support of the indigenous economy.”<sup>13</sup> CMO efforts then were limited to either minimizing the impact on troop movements of refugees fleeing the war zone, or local civilian medical or economic assistance. The latter could only be done when requested by the Korean local or federal government. So while in World War II, CA forces were running the governments of occupied territories, in Korea they were limited to local medical treatment of civilians and population resource control to reduce congestion of the main supply routes. The study also indicated that there was a lack of emphasis placed on recruiting good CA officers. It said that, “The quality of military personnel assigned to civil affairs in Korea, as measured by education and efficiency ratings, is not commensurate with the actual importance of the function. This condition may be taken as an indication of the low level of importance attached to civil affairs at all echelons.”<sup>14</sup> The study said that military commanders only influenced local leaders as much as necessary to accomplish their mission. Part of the reason for this was that there was a government with which the US Army was dealing. Unlike in World War II, during the Korean conflict, the South Korean Government was still functioning. The US Army was not an occupying power as it had been in World War II.

Throughout the Viet Nam war and even into present operations, the tendency has been to minimize US Governmental interference and let populations continue to govern themselves as much as possible. This is not always realistic and many times the population cannot be trusted to govern themselves due to insurgencies, instability, and a weakness of local government or law enforcement. Where there is an existing government with which the US Army is working, however, the US Army must honor that

government. In Viet Nam, as in Korea, there was an established government that the US was committed to sustaining. It would have been contrary to US interests to take over either of those governments with the military. As much as was possible, within the ability of the US Army during the last two conflicts (Afghanistan and Iraq), the governing of occupied or liberated territories has been avoided by the Army. There are many reasons for this, but it could be assumed that the primary reasons were not only were insufficient forces available for constabulary duty, but the more deeply involved the US Army became in actually performing government functions, the longer it would take to turn that governing requirement over to the citizens of the occupied or liberated territory. Clearly, the most cost-effective means for any army in an occupied territory to govern that territory is to allow self-government.

One major difference in the CA soldiers of World War II and subsequent wars has been the fact that in World War II CA soldiers were hand selected for the CA/MG school according to their specialties and according to the needs of the Army.<sup>15</sup> In subsequent wars, CA soldiers have been almost exclusively a volunteer organization. The problem with this volunteer system is that the Army has to make do with what it has. There is very little ability to tailor the personnel within the force for a given contingency. An example of this is the CA specialist who is in the Education team. He may be a high school principle back home, or even a superintendent of education. The chances are just as good, however, that he is a kindergarten teacher or a school office supply sales person with a degree in secondary education. There is no standard as to what qualifications a person has to have to be on a special team in one of the sixteen CA functional skills.

The major difference between World War II CA forces and today's CA forces is the specific tasks which they are being asked to perform. CA forces have not run a city, state or federal government since World War II. The last two conflicts in which the US has engaged have reinforced the need for CA personnel who can assess the problems with a particular system and recommend a method to repair it, and not personnel trained to govern a city, province or country.

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 8 February 2001), GL-4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2000), 5-14.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, 3-4, 3-20, 3-22.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Geneva Convention, *Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, 12 August 1949. Part I, Articles 1,2 & 3.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Joint Publication 3-57.1, GL-11.

<sup>10</sup>General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, *Civil Affairs And Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 7 August 1945, Part III, Chapter 1, 13, paragraph 14.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 14, para. 16 &17.

<sup>12</sup>Henry A. Kissenger and C. Darwin Stolzenbach, *Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-51* (Technical Memorandum 41, Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University, October 1951).

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>15</sup>General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, *Civil Affairs and Military Government*, 14-15, paragraph 17.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In the contemporary operational environment (COE), CA utilization generally is executed in the following manner: An AC unit has a habitual working relationship with an RC unit for war-plans. These two units are supposed to train together as much as possible during peacetime, but they do not usually have that opportunity. In reality what normally happens is that one or two soldiers from the RC unit may have the opportunity to participate in a staff training exercise with the supported unit every two to three years. This is some help, but it loses much of its value due to the rotational schedule for positions within the AC, which is every twelve to eighteen months. When the RC soldiers do get to train with the supported unit it is never the same staff or commander that they trained with on the last training event. Due to this, all of the SOPs and TTPs have changed. Also it is never the entire RC unit that gets to train with the supported unit. It is one or perhaps two staff officers and occasionally a soldier or two. And when there is an entire detachment or company, it is an ad hoc group and not one that is used to working together.

The infrequency of training events between the AC and RC soldiers is not the fault of the RC unit. The RC chain of command has to schedule training around the personal and professional lives of their soldiers. The unit is comprised of people who are not professional soldiers by trade. This does not call into question the professionalism of the RC soldiers, it is just stating that the profession of arms is not how they pay their bills and feed their families. It is, therefore, not fair or realistic to expect RC units to be able to

adhere to AC units schedules for training. These problems are due to the force structure, which is designed around World War II doctrine.

When an AC unit gets deployed for a contingency, the RC unit gets mobilized. The mobilization process takes around thirty days. That is thirty days before the RC unit can get into the theater of operations. By the thirty day point, the AC unit HQ has already written their Operations Order (OPORD) and deployed into a Forward Staging Base (FSB) or a Marshalling area where they prepare to receive the rest of their forces and continue to work on their plan. The RC forces follow on and join the AC forces as soon as lift assets are capable of getting them and their equipment to the AC location. Many times the RC soldiers do not get integrated into the AC formations until well after combat operations have commenced. This does not afford the maneuver commander much time to assess the level of maturity, competency, professionalism and experience of his assigned CA soldier. This is true at all levels, even though the primary staff normally get their augmentation far earlier than the combat forces. With the maneuver commander having questions in his mind, such as mentioned above, he may be very hesitant to allow his CA soldiers much freedom of maneuver during times when security is questionable. This hurts the CA soldier's ability to do his job early in the combat phase of the operation. That is not to say the maneuver commander should do anything differently. He is responsible for everything that happens within his area of operations (AO), and therefore must use his best judgment when allowing the soldiers assigned to him freedom of maneuver.

The Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMs) are regionally aligned to the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). When a CACOM gets mobilized, it supports a COCOM. The

CACOM staff augments the COCOM G5 staff and any other positions the COCOM CDR wants to fill with the CACOM soldiers. A CA brigade normally supports a maneuver corps in the same manner, and a CA battalion supports a maneuver division. A CA company or direct support (DS) detachment supports at Brigade level. At the maneuver battalion level a commander may expect to see a half dozen CA soldiers, normally one to two civil affairs teams (CAT-A).

Once integrated into the unit, the tactical level CA soldiers begin advising their immediate commander on any CA related issues. They also begin making assessments of the infrastructure as it relates to the populace, current and follow-on operations and the soldiers in the AO. The CA soldiers also assess and report the condition and attitudes of the people in the AO. They prioritize the problems within the AO for the commander and recommend the best way to proceed with repairing the problem. If it is within the commanders abilities to repair the problem without hampering his mission, then he may put the CA soldiers in charge of monitoring the problem and managing its repair. The problem may be of such importance that the maneuver commander thinks that it should take priority over his current mission, in which case the CMO problem then becomes his main effort. The problem may be of such magnitude that the maneuver commander cannot affect it. He will then pass it up his chain of command to a level where it can be addressed. These tactical decisions are driven by many factors. The CA soldier's advice is very important in helping the maneuver commander prioritize his effort.

The aforementioned problems are not necessarily infrastructure problems, even though that is normally the first thing that comes to mind when CA assessments are mentioned. It may be, for example, that the people's opinion of the maneuver force is

very low and the maneuver commander can affect that. This may require the maneuver commander to sit down with his CA advisor and his Psychological Operations (PSYOP) advisor (depending on the level of command he may or may not have access to these people) and develop a message to distribute to the populace. If the opinion of the populace is beyond the control of the maneuver commander, it may be within the power of his next higher commander to affect. It may not even matter what the populace thinks. These are matters which must be weighed by the commander and are all situationally dependent.

Once maneuver has stopped and the maneuver unit is in charge of the security of an area, CMO normally becomes the maneuver commander's primary focus. Force protection, infrastructure repair, and civil order are the commander's objectives. By the time these stability and support operations (SASO) begin, the CA soldiers assigned to the unit should already have a prioritized list of projects for the commander. These projects are forwarded up the chain of command and their status is usually tracked by the higher headquarters, depending upon their importance. If the project is beyond the capabilities of the maneuver element at the level that originated the report, the higher headquarters will send augmentation to the lower element to try to get the problem resolved. The CA soldiers at all levels will continually maintain contact and coordination with any other government agency (OGA), IO, or NGO which may be able to assist in resolving the problem. This interagency coordination is a vital role of the CA soldiers and units.

At the upper levels of the CA infrastructure, CACOM or brigade, there is usually some type of organized center of CA activity. This may be a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), or a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). These are



not exactly the same thing, but the differences, for the purpose of this thesis, are academic. These are places where representatives from US Army, OGA, IO, NGO and local (host nation) civic leaders can meet and share information. The host nation may establish the HOC. It may not be a US Military organization. In this case, the US Army only sends representatives for support of the HOC. At the tactical level this establishment is called a Civil Military Operations Center, (CMOC). Like the relationship between the HOC and the HACC, a CMOC is not exactly the same as the former two, but the differences are negligible. According to FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, appendix H, paragraph H-4, they perform basically the same function at different levels with some specific stipulations for each. The CMOC, since it is a tactical level organization, may be only a table placed under a tree with some chairs and a poncho to act as a shelter in the event of rain. The size and detail of the CMOC are not as important as its function. There are also international versions of these in UN or NATO operations. The UN and NATO call their coordination centers Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC) or Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC).

As their names imply, the coordination centers (HOC, HACC, or CMOC) are a place for all of the previously mentioned groups of organizations to gather and share information. They greatly aid the CA soldier in leveraging support from non-military organizations, which have many more resources than the army could possibly rally in support of a humanitarian operation. It is vital that the maneuver commander at any level be able to trust his CA soldiers to give them freedom of maneuver to perform the necessary coordination functions to make the coordination centers work for the army.

According to LTC John White, a CA team leader in the 96th CA Battalion during Operation Uphold Democracy, the soldiers of the 96th CA Battalion were allowed as much freedom of maneuver as necessary to complete their mission in Haiti. They were restricted by the amount of money and assets they were given to accomplish the mission, but that is always a shortfall of CMO. The 96th CA supported 3 SFG. The units that supported 10th Mountain Division (10th MT DIV) were very restricted in the freedom of movement that they were allowed. (Some 96th CA teams supported the 10th MT, but mostly it was the RC units.) The 10th MT DIV was very cautious in allowing anyone outside of the perimeter. This was a function of the command climate at the time, right after the 10th MT DIV's and Rangers' experiences in Somalia.<sup>1</sup>

While there is supposed to be a habitual relationship between RC CA units and AC supported maneuver units, the RC soldiers have an extra hurdle to clear since they are not a "known quantity" to their supported units. As has already been mentioned, the training relationship between RC and AC units is not sufficient to maintain continuity and give maneuver commanders the level of comfort they need to allow RC CA units to operate with any level of autonomy. For example, no matter what AC unit an RC unit was supporting, the RC unit would not be allowed as much freedom of maneuver as the AC unit until they had been deployed for a reasonable amount of time. Simply the commander's lack of knowledge of the unit's level of training would preclude the maneuver commander from being able to give the RC unit as much freedom of maneuver as he may otherwise give to an AC unit, at least until they had operated together for a reasonable amount of time.

Lieutenant Colonel White's team collected weapons, assessed infrastructure, established the legitimacy of the Haitian police force by having them accompany the 96th CA teams on patrols, and provided repairs to infrastructure as they were able. In one particular instance they coordinated for repairs to a road, which traversed the side of a mountain. The repairs were vital in order to get goods up and down the mountain. They convinced the local populace to perform the work. The locals were very happy to do the work in order to permit transportation of the supplies. They understood that the supplies would not get to them if the road were not repaired and that the tactical situation did not allow Americans to perform the actual labor. The local populace benefited further by having a way to get their agricultural goods to the cities at the bottom of the mountain.

All of the CA work done in Haiti required a considerable amount of coordination and transportation. Without freedom of movement the coordination would not have been possible. The units who were assigned to the 10th MT DIV reported being very frustrated at not having the ability to do their jobs due to the lack of mobility imposed upon them.<sup>2</sup> This may have been a problem for any unit augmenting the 10th MT DIV at that time, but it is also a function of the problems encountered when reserve soldiers make up the bulk of a particular military occupational specialty. The force protection measures were probably much more restrictive on the RC soldiers than they were on the AC soldiers due to the fact that the AC soldiers were not as comfortable with the RC elements and having them operate independently. Active duty soldiers with a habitual working relationship with the supported unit may have had more flexibility than did the reserve CA soldiers. Furthermore, if the CA soldiers were assigned (or attached) to the maneuver unit, the CA soldiers would have been a part of the development of the CMO plan. The maneuver unit

would have then known what the requirements were for transportation assets, freedom of movement and coordination prior to arriving in Haiti.

In the COE the media is ever present and they have instantaneous global capabilities. Anything that a soldier does to interact with the populace will probably be visible to the media, and is therefore more closely scrutinized by the chain of command. This makes CA activities even more sensitive than they were during World War II. Due to this the maneuver commanders want the most mature and well-trained CA soldiers available at the tactical level. These soldiers probably have families and jobs in the civilian sector from which they are absent during hostilities. If they are well trained at their civilian job, they are not inclined to leave it to join the army for any longer than is necessary to complete their military mission. This is why they are in the RC rather than the AC. During World War II all soldiers were on active duty until the war was over or until they were killed or discharged, unlike today. The problem that this poses for today's units is the inability to retain CA forces on active duty for any period greater than two years. The combination of these two factors alone will cause an inevitable inability to continue to support the maneuver forces with trained CA soldiers in the immediate future. In February 2004 there will be a brief period during the rotation of CA units that ninety one percent of all RC CA units will be on active duty simultaneously.<sup>3</sup> This means that there is no hope for a rotation schedule, which allows any sense of normalcy for civilian commercial employers within the US to conduct and effect planning. In less than two years the CA unit rotating out of theater will have to be re-mobilized to go back into theater for a period of up to two years. A CA Company commander, Major Don Gardner, said, "USAR CA went too strong to this fight early on, and now we have no USAR folks

to support future rotations.”<sup>4</sup> To address this issue, either, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) must be reduced, CA forces must be transferred to the AC, or forces other than CA troops must pick up the major portion of the CA tasks. Due to the GWOT, the US OPTEMPO is only going to increase, the transfer of CA billets to the active component would require an act of Congress, and many non-CA troops are currently performing CA tasks. This causes the maneuver commander to have to make a choice as to where he is going to put his main focus.

A good example of how this is already being done comes from Iraq. Early in the reconstruction phase in April 2003, the CFLCC CMO officer, COL Martin Stanton, along with the CINC re-construction, Brigadier General Alvin Whitley (UK), saw the need to find a large employer to reconstitute in order to put as many Iraqis as possible back to work. Infrastructure repairs were already being made to the electrical, oil and water systems as much as the security situation would allow, but the public and industrial transportation system was in a state of extreme disrepair. To put the railroad back to work would facilitate industry in several sectors as well as allow the Iraqi citizens to travel between cities as they had not done in many years due to Saddam Hussein’s tight control on the people and their resources. To begin this process, there had to be a meeting between the CMO officer and the highest civilian railroad employee remaining in Baghdad. COL Stanton and a couple of members of his staff went to the railroad station in Baghdad and asked where the leadership of the railroad could be found and could a meeting be arranged? Within a couple of days a meeting was arranged and the railroad was re-established. Several weeks later the first train ran from Baghdad to Um Qasr. The specifics of organizing the payment of the railroad workers and the terms of their

returning to work were done by a few staff officers, none of which were CA specialists. Security for the meetings as well as the payments was provided by the infantry unit in whose AO the railroad headquarters fell. All actions between the US Army and the Iraqis were coordinated with the infantry commander in the region. As the security situation stabilized, the task of organizing and maintaining these parts of the infrastructure fell almost solely to the maneuver commanders in the various AO's in Iraq. Members of the 354 CA Brigade were integral in the coordination of subsequent payments to the Iraqi railroad until it began to generate income.

This specific CMO was generated from the operational level of command to the tactical level. Normally CMOs are generated at the tactical level, but they can occur from any level necessary to achieve US objectives. The important thing to realize is that it was an enormous CMO in which very few CA forces were used and the maneuver commander was integrally involved. The maneuver commander had to shift focus from war fighting to CMO and allocate resources accordingly. The CA forces were coordinators and organizers who were not involved in running the government and specific expertise was not needed. There were no railroad experts on the CA staff, nor were there economists or labor attorneys.

Another good example of how CA forces are currently being used comes from an AAR from CAT-A 43 (civil affairs team-A) who was OPCON to 1-505(-), 82nd Airborne Division, in Afghanistan in November 2002. The battalion (-) was air assaulting into remote mountain villages where intelligence indicated there may be weapons caches. As the infantry soldiers located and destroyed the caches, the CA soldiers went to the nearby villages and talked to the inhabitants. They distributed humanitarian daily rations

(HDRs), which are civilian versions of the military's meals ready to eat (MRE). They also distributed miscellaneous hand held construction tools, school supplies, medical kits and blankets. CA soldiers performed assessments of the state of the villages and also conducted battle damage assessments. The results of these operations were positive for all objectives. With the exception of damage claims resulting from the cache disposal, the population's response was overwhelming, enthusiastic and positive. Coordination between village leaders and Coalition Force leaders was easily accomplished with interpreter support. Follow-up damage assessments and claims responses occurred throughout the operation. The only improvement which was recommended was to expedite the payment of legitimate damage claims to reinforce the positive and legitimate perception of the coalition forces.<sup>5</sup>

Based on what the battalion and lower levels of command are currently doing, substantiated by the above AAR, there is very little for which specialized CA forces are required at that level.

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<sup>1</sup>LTC Jon White, former team leader in 96th CA, currently an instructor in CGSC at Fort Leavenworth KS, interview by author, 16 November 2003 at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>LTC Christopher Smrt, currently a plans officer in 308th CA, interview by author, November, 2003, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>4</sup>MAJ Don Gardiner, currently the 101st Airborne G5, interview by author, telephone and e-mail, 6 April 2004.

<sup>5</sup>Civil Affairs Team-A 43, After Actions Review (82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, 16 November 2002).

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CURRENT TASKS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

#### Civil Military Operations

In chapter 1 is the definition of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in accordance with Joint Publication 1-02. This definition is very important for the maneuver commander to know and understand. The first sentence of the definition says, “The activities of a commander that establish . . . relations between military forces . . . and the civilian populace in a . . . operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve US objectives.” These are the activities of the commander. These activities can be delegated to whom ever the commander wishes, but they are still the commander’s responsibility. Many CA soldiers report that the command gives every task involving the civil populace to their CA element. This is his prerogative if he chooses to employ his CA soldiers in this manner, but it is not doctrinally their task. Doctrinally, CA activities are a function, which fit under the larger CMO umbrella. According to Joint Publication 3-57, chapter 2, paragraph 3, page II-5, “CA activities are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority.” So these activities, which are turned over to specialists as CA activities, are still part of the greater CMO, and the responsibility of the maneuver commander. As has been mentioned, these sixteen functional specialties were designed to replace government ministries when the US Army was performing the duties of the local government in the absence of that government until it could be re-established. The US Army has not been a de facto government since World War II. In the COE the US Army may help the local



government perform certain tasks, or in the absence of a local government may help re-establish a government, but it has not been the policy of the US Army to act as the established government since World War II.

It has been argued that maneuver commanders at all levels are uneducated on the doctrine of CMO and how civil affairs fits under that doctrine. While this may have had some validity in years past, the more likely scenario is that maneuver commanders at all levels cannot do CMO while the security situation does not permit it. Maneuver commanders may not like to do CMO and may pass it off to the CA forces whenever there are forces available to pass it off too, because CMO is seen as a distracter to offensive operations and very resource intensive. Whatever the reason, it is important for commanders to understand their unit's role in CMO and the capabilities and limitations of CA soldiers. An example of this comes from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) where the V Corps commander LTG William S. Wallace said that his CA soldiers (in the early part of the war) did a lot of assessments, but never actually rectified the situations that they were assessing. "They could tell you what was broken, but not how long it would be until it was repaired."<sup>1</sup> He said that as the security situation stabilized, the CA forces were able to make more tangible progress to demonstrate to the Iraqi people the non-hostile intent of the US soldiers. The reason for this apparent lack of ability to affect problems was that as the situation stabilized, the maneuver commanders were more able to apply resources to the CMO problem. These resources were previously occupied providing security. As the security situation improved, the CMO tasks became more and more the main effort. The CA soldiers never had any resources to apply to the problem. They only prioritized the tasks identified by their assessments, recommended a course of action to their

commander, and aided him as best they could to accomplish this task to its fruition. As mentioned in the LTG Wallace example it may be that the commander only seems to not understand CMO or CA capabilities and limitations. In reality this may only be the appearance. The maneuver commander may simply have so many other issues with which he is currently engaged that his only option is to instruct CA soldiers to do what they can for the time being to alleviate the problem and that he will address rebuilding the infrastructure as he is able. CA becomes a temporary band-aid on the greater CMO problem until it can be addressed at the higher levels. This does not imply that he does not think that their assessments are important. The maneuver commander simply finds himself in a security situation which is so unstable that he cannot allow non-combat forces (engineers, contractors, international organizations (IO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO)) into the area to repair a problem.

On occasion, a CA soldier may find himself in the situation where his maneuver commander truly does not understand the capabilities and limitations of CA, nor CMO doctrine. If this is the case, it is incumbent upon the CA soldier to educate his commander as to the CA soldier's proper employment. In the end, however, it is the maneuver commander's decision as to how he chooses to employ the assets assigned, attached, or under his operational control. CMO is the maneuver commander's task and CA activities are a key part of that task.

Many people are of the opinion that it is not the job of the US Army to conduct "nation building." While that is a topic of debate that affects every segment of the army and may never reach a conclusion, it is a fact that the US Army is currently performing "CMO." Since the army is being required to perform this mission, it is prudent that the

army should be prepared and organized in the best way possible to successfully complete that task. As has been mentioned, the army has not been a military government since World War II. What, therefore, is the expectation of the army with regard to CMO? The army must be prepared to protect American interests and simultaneously establish or nurture a fledgling government. The new government will have to be helped in the four areas described in the acronym DIME. That is diplomatic, information, military and economic aid. That entails peacekeeping operations (PKO), security operations, training missions or mobile training teams (MTT), and civil assistance. The army should expect to be in a foreign or occupied country for as short of a time as is necessary to establish that country's ability to perform these tasks for itself. There may be an American presence in the country in question for many years, but the major combat forces should not anticipate being there for more than a year or two after major offensive operations have ceased. Once the CMOs have stabilized the security situation of the new government and the new government's army and police forces are capable of allowing all of the aspects of the DIME. to work unhindered, the various US Government agencies would take over the mission and the majority of the US Army forces could redeploy to the US

The army will not establish the government for the foreign country. The US State Department will help the government do this, but the military role there will be limited to security to allow for elections, etcetera. The Army may help reestablish commerce, but that will primarily be done by the US Department of State and Department of the Treasury. Once again the military role is limited to security and some small infrastructure repairs. The Army will have a much larger role in helping establish or reestablish the occupied government's military and information operations. Many of the tasks that will

be performed by the State Department or OGA or NGOs will be predicated upon the work done by the US Army. For example, before reconstruction can begin, assessments must be made of the condition of various infrastructure and priorities must be established as to what must be repaired first. Some minor repairs to infrastructure may be performed by the Army. All assessments and priorities can be established by the Army before contractors, OGA or NGOs even arrive. The army will have the task of training a new national army or police force for the occupied government. As the police forces and/or the army of the new government are trained and employed, the security situation will become less and less hostile. All of this falls under the umbrella of CMO.

Maneuver commanders understand that the training time required to perform their mission essential tasks is very extensive. To add more tasks to the mission essential task list would mean spending less time training the things that the unit does much more frequently than these collateral activities. As mentioned, however, if the army is going to be required to conduct these missions, at least it should be as proficient as possible in them.

This point is well made by CPT Daniel Morgan. CPT Morgan is the former commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3 Battalion, 502 Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division. Regarding his experiences during OIF, with reference to CMO, CPT Morgan said,

This topic deserves serious attention from our senior leaders. I feel we lack the experience, training and resources at the brigade level and down. We need to implement this facet of full spectrum operations more into our Army education system and equip the “boots on the ground” soldiers with the capabilities. Nevertheless, these shortcomings do not give an excuse for a lack of company efforts in information and civil-military operations. Creativity and initiative by company commanders make the difference.

Civil-military and information operations (CMO/IO) are not mutually exclusive. (Maneuver) Commanders must take personal responsibility of these efforts. CMO/IO reinforce the success of each undertaking. The more successful CMO is in your sector, the more positive your IO will be for you. Brigade prioritizes CMO at the company level, meaning you are directed to focus on certain projects for the community. These projects will vary from schools, utilities, sanitation, and reconstruction. IO, however, provides a company commander an opportunity to take control of his sector, earning the respect of local officials and citizens. Information operations are simple at the company level. They have two purposes. First, you must distribute information to the people, . . . and second you must collect information.

The first step in CMO/IO is to identify in priority areas to be funded for CMO. Simultaneously, commanders need situational understanding of the mindset of the sector. There are many TTPs that help in accomplishing this assessment. First, commanders need to determine who can help them. I broke my focal groups into business, education, political, and religious. Since we were the first forces into Mosul, Iraq, my soldiers and I had to get out into the streets and meet people. We developed a “list of influence” and began developing relationships.

Leaders must understand the environment prior to committing blindly to some CMO plan. I had no true understanding of the mindset of the citizens in my sector. In addition, there were no performance measures of effectiveness to determine any success we were having in our efforts. Consequently, I developed a survey of attitudes and needs in Arabic that was common across all my sub-sectors. My soldiers hated this at first, but in the end we saw where we needed to be and what we needed to do. This situational understanding is vital to CMO/IO. Performance measures of effectiveness prevent wasted efforts, allocate resources efficiently and focus your company on valid, verifiable priorities.<sup>2</sup>

CPT Morgan gave a great example of the environment that the leadership of US forces is facing at the maneuver company and battalion level. The question becomes Should we continue to face this environment using World War II CMO doctrine? And the next question that presents itself is, What changes to CMO doctrine become evident from US Army lessons learned in recent conflicts?

### Civil Affairs

Specifically what are the expectations of CA soldiers at the tactical level? As previously alluded to, US operations since World War II suggest that the tasks are limited

to assessing the systems in the maneuver AO and recommending to the commander priorities for repairing the systems assessed. The CA soldiers may also recommend some small projects that the maneuver element has the resources to repair. Once recommended, the CA soldiers will monitor the project until it is complete. The CA soldiers are also part of the planning process and bring to the fight some level of expertise in human relations, organization and perhaps culture. CA forces are also very aware of the message that the higher headquarters is trying to exhibit to the local populace. At the higher levels of command the CA soldiers and officers are expected to consolidate the assessments, monitor their progress and keep the maneuver commander informed as to the status of the civil situation. That is, the state of the public systems, the mood of the populace and the priority of effort for re-construction.

This is demonstrated by a news release from Baghdad in June of 2003.

The 411th CA Battalion, an Army Reserve unit from Danbury, Connecticut, is rebuilding sewer lines in a run down part of the city, and providing food for a neglected group of people. "Rebuilding infrastructure and police and fire are the keys to success," said MAJ Joseph Charles Sasso. "The pipe-building mission is a case in point," he said.

The infrastructure of the area--the power lines, sewage pipes, water lines and roads--are in bad shape either because of poor workmanship or neglect during Saddam's regime. Sasso's team made a deal with a local general contractor, Kasim Taher Naser, to replace the worn-out pipes that exist in the area. A contractor that Sasso is working with has promised to replace the lines according to the quality of American engineering standards. Sasso and his team regularly check on projects like these to ensure that the work is moving along smoothly. While assessing the progress of the project, and performing a quality control check, the unit also has the opportunity to address other issues that citizens of the area have. Working with an interpreter, Sasso spoke to people with concerns ranging from looters to water and electricity shortages. "We serve as a nucleus for people to grieve or look for resolution," Sasso said.

While the question of electricity, water and sewage are being addressed, the 411th is also helping some citizens eat. Another team from the 411th CA Battalion recently delivered approximately 1,000 meals to displaced families

living in the former Al Rashid military complex, said SGT David Glass, a CA specialist from the 411th.<sup>3</sup>

Another example of the uses of CA in the COE comes from the Second Battalion of the Seventieth Armor Regiment and the 490 CA Battalion, a reserve unit from Abilene, Texas assigned to the Third Brigade, 1 Armored Division, who worked to renovate and repair several schools in the Abu-Gharib section of Baghdad.

Buildings that had no electricity, running water or windows prior to the arrival of US soldiers, now have that entire basic infrastructure and plus fresh coats of paint on the exterior and interior walls. Munitions no longer lay around in schoolyards and are no longer stored in classrooms. Soldiers removed the ordinance, making the facilities ready for the children's education. There are still three more schools to do before the unit's job is finished.

A team from the 490, known as GS-3, oversaw the financing and supervision of the reconstruction project. They in-turn hired the Al Saniaa Contraction Company, a local business, to perform the work that was needed on the building. More than \$35,000 was used on the Al Thabat school to get it back into proper condition. Soldiers from Task Force First Armored Division's Second Battalion, Seventieth Armor Regiment and the 490 CA Battalion, also worked to repair the buildings and clear munitions.<sup>4</sup>

In Western Iraq CA forces were performing slightly different missions, but still in the realm of infrastructure. According to the 353 CACOM, via the CENTCOM PAO,

"We work with NGO's and IO's to get food, medicine, clothes and clean water to the small communities in Western Iraq," Said Master Sergeant Joe Rodriguez, US Army Civil Affairs. In this mission Master Sergeant Rodriguez is joined by Major Dave Menagon from the 304 CA Brigade, Philadelphia, Penn. They are working with the NGO Greek Orthodox Church donating food and the Convoy of Hope donating furniture and beds to the hospital in Ar Rutbah, Iraq. The CA officers met up with the NGOs at the border of Jordan and Iraq. They had prearranged a smooth transition across the border with the CA members there. Sergeant Daniel Bowen, a CA Noncommissioned Officer also with the 353, is at the border to make sure Humanitarian Assistance convoys transition across the border smoothly. "It can be a nightmare getting people and vehicles across the border into Iraq," said Bowen. "There are a lot of people in cars and trucks wanting to go into Iraq, so we make it our job to make sure Humanitarian Assistance gets through smoothly." The trucks and cars made it across the border with little trouble to the delight of Sotirious Vagias, Director, Church of Greece. "I am so happy we made contact with the Civil Affairs people before we came

here,” said Vagias. “It would have been next to impossible for us to do in a week what it took Civil Affairs only hours to do.”<sup>5</sup>

All of the aforementioned things could be as easily accomplished by a maneuver squad leader with some assistance from his platoon. There would be a need for some additional schooling and an additional skill identifier, but the tasks currently being performed by CA forces at the tactical level could all be performed by maneuver forces. At the higher levels of command there is still a need for CA specialists. These specialists could be a combination of active duty CA soldiers and officers who have been schooled and developed for CA work from within the army and reservists.

According to MAJ Val Sigfried, the 101st Airborne Division G-5, in his AO in most cases there were sufficient native Iraqi professionals (doctors, lawyers, administrators, etc.) already in IZ to perform their normal functions. The need was for coordination and organization of these professionals to accomplish their work.<sup>6</sup>

According to LTC Mark Yanaway of the 308th CA Brigade, with regard to functional specialty teams,

We tried using the functional teams as teams for the (combat phase of the) war and early part of the summer. It became evident that there was no mission for them in this regard. By the time we left Iraq Most of the unit had been parceled out to the ministries in the CPA (coalition provisional authority). Of the 1500 or so CPA personnel over 100 were seconded CA officers and Enlisted. There were even more CA personnel who came over as civilians assigned to CPA directly. This was the best use of our personnel and the Brigade likely should have been assigned to CPA and not V Corps from the beginning.<sup>7</sup>

If this is the case, the CPA should have requested through OSD that this unit be assigned to them and not absconded with them in theater. Conventional wisdom says that these personnel would have been more readily accessible had they been hired as government contractors or at least in an IMA (individual military augmentee) status



rather than to piecemeal a unit. It is far easier to mobilize and transport individuals than to do the same with units. When asked if this status would work for CA reservists, LTC Yanaway said,

It would likely have been better for the army. I have long thought that in any event the 96th CA should deploy, assess, determine what specialists and reserve follow on forces are needed and then ONLY those forces should be sent. They should also only be deployed for the periods of time they are needed, not for nine months or a year because that is the way the army is deployed. Civilian contractors have that sort of flexibility whereas reserve units don't seem to, though they could. It would not be as good for the individuals though. The benefits of being a reservist field grade in theater are usually better than what a contractor could offer. On the other hand, more of us might be willing to make multiple, short, four to six month deployments, whereas the year-long one I just came off of has made it difficult to face another deployment.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>LTG William Scott Wallace, Commander US Army's V Corps, Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by author, at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 November 2003.

<sup>2</sup>CPT Daniel Morgan, "Going to fight in Iraq? Lessons learned from an Infantry Company Commander" 23 January 2004, article available online at [webmail.us.army.mil/frame.html](mailto:webmail.us.army.mil/frame.html); 10 February 2004, Internet.

<sup>3</sup>SPC Ryan Smith, *Army News Service*, 19 June 2003, article available at [www4.army.mil/ocpa/read](http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read); 17 March 2004, Internet.

<sup>4</sup>"Bulldog Brigade Renovates Abu-Gharib Schools," *The Old Ironsides Report*, 1st Armored Division News letter, 13 February 2004; available from [www.1ad.army.mil/OldIronsidesReport/16Sep03.pdf](http://www.1ad.army.mil/OldIronsidesReport/16Sep03.pdf); Internet.

<sup>5</sup>LTC Mark Brown, *Civil Affairs Winning the Hearts and Minds in Western Iraq*, USCENTCOM/PAO, 2003; available from [www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/](http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/); Internet

<sup>6</sup>MAJ Val Sigfried, 101st Airborne G5, telephone interview by author, 31 March 2004.

<sup>7</sup>LTC Mark Yanaway, 308th CA plans officer, electronic mail interview by author, 6 April 2004.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 4

### RECOMMENDATION

The CA structure the Army now knows should cease to exist. From this current structure, the best and brightest CA NCOs and officers should be extracted to fill the slots in the newly recommended structure. This structure will be referred to as the recommendation. In the recommendation, there will be no RC CA units. CMO will be performed by the maneuver units, whose responsibility it is to begin with. CA NCOs and officers will be on the S, G, C, or J5 staffs. This is where they were intended when the S5 staff was developed during World War II. If they re-number the staff positions, it is not important, so long as the maneuver commander has the tools to perform the requirement that is being asked of him. There will only be RC individual military augmentees (IMAs). RC soldiers should be given the opportunity to transition to AC if they so desire, but they would have to attend whatever requisite schooling they needed to perform their maneuver unit's function.

With regard to AC CA forces, they will not change much in composition from what is now available. The role of AC CA forces will, however, change immensely. The 96th CA Battalion may grow into a regiment, or it may stay as a battalion. The size of the unit is really yet to be determined. First the mission of the 96th must be focused in order to complete a troop to task analysis. The need for 18 series soldiers (SF soldiers) in the 96th is also in question. The 96th will provide forces for non-combat or peacetime engagements such as hurricane relief or humanitarian and civic actions. Also they will augment the maneuver forces as needed when there is a humanitarian crisis in

conjunction with combat. This would not be a change from their current mission of population and resource control.

The AC CA forces will be augmented as needed in peacetime engagements by the CA specialists from the Army's pool of subject matter experts. This will help keep a presence in many countries in which the US currently has interest. It will also help keep sharp the military skills of the specialists who happen to be RC CA soldiers.

Every maneuver company, troop, or company level unit in the Army will send two NCOs per platoon to a two, three or four week CA course (whatever length of school is necessary to train combat arms maneuver soldiers to perform basic assessments). The First Sergeant will also attend this course. This will be an additional duty for these NCOs. They will perform the task of assessing infrastructure, prioritizing these assessments and identifying particular projects, which are within the abilities of the maneuver unit to affect. The first sergeant will consolidate and verify these assessments and forward them to the CA officer at battalion. The first sergeant may need some additional schooling as his duties allow. As the primary logistician, senior NCO and normally the soldier with the most time in the company, he is already in a perfect position to perform these additional duties without any interference with his current requirements. USACAPOC(A) needs just to show him what and how to assess, and what assets he has at his disposal to perform this function. For these NCOs, this CA designator creates a future possibility should he ever wish to become a CA NCO on a battalion, brigade, division, corps or theater staff.

All of the positions mentioned below are AC, and permanently assigned to the maneuver units, with the exception of the CA specialists. CA specialists will be

temporarily tasked to the maneuver units to perform a specific function. They may be RC or AC.

At the battalion level there will be a MAJ CA officer (FA {functional area} 39 {CA}) who will consolidate and prioritize the battalion's assessments and forward them to brigade. He will have an E6 assistant. They will keep the maneuver commander informed of the state of CMO activities in their sector, as well as coordinate with the higher headquarters and any IOs, NGOs, or OGAs working in their AO. At the brigade level there will be an assigned O4/O5 CA officer (FA 39). He will have an E7 assistant. They will perform the same coordination functions as the CA officers and NCOs at battalion. At the division level there will be an O6 CA officer (FA 39) who would coordinate the efforts of all of the brigades in his sector. He will have an E8 assistant and the required staff. They would be the conduit to the Corps, CJFLCC, JTF or whatever structure he fell under. At the Corps, CJFLCC, JTF level there will be an O6/O7 CA officer (FA 39). He will also have an E9 assistant and a staff. They will coordinate the CMO efforts for the AO. At the COCOM there would be a MG CA officer (FA 39) who will coordinate the CMO efforts across the theater.

As the maneuver forces are conducting offensive operations, the maneuver soldiers with a CA designator will perform their normal functions. When the offensive operations stop and each maneuver force has a sector for which it is responsible, the CA soldiers will begin making assessments and prioritizing them and passing them to the First Sergeant. He will then consolidate them and pass them to the CA officer at battalion. The current method in which the RC soldiers perform their functions is not

nearly this responsive. Furthermore, this is not an undue stress on the AC soldiers nor the First Sergeant beyond their normal duties.

At each level there will be a culling process as the items, which the next higher level can affect, are pulled out and tasked to that unit. So for example, the battalion S3 officer may take the assessments of all three companies and task to the battalion two or three of them, which are within the battalion's ability to repair. The S3 will task whatever battalion asset can affect it. The battalion commander or S3 may wish to see all of the assessments before they are forwarded to brigade. That is his option. In a short amount of time the battalion commander and S3 will develop a working relationship with the CA officer in which each will know what the other expects and is capable producing.

Each level of command would be allocated a certain amount of money to spend on CMO projects to improve their sector. CA soldiers need the ability to "let" contracts for infrastructure repair. When 3ID attacked into Baghdad, the Iraqi people saw the only government that most of them had ever known decimated in a matter of days. The expectation that this created was incredible. These people were not defeated as a populace the way the Germans or the Japanese had been in World War II. Due to new precision munitions and concern for "collateral damage" the Iraqi people only experienced a minor inconvenience in their daily lives. The appetite for change was so great that no single organization could have satisfied it. Had CA soldiers had a few large companies and an allocation of financial resources at their disposal immediately, they may have been able to prevent many of the undecided Iraqis from becoming disgruntled and violent. Empowering a CA soldier to initiate a request for a contract for infrastructure repair in his maneuver commander's area of responsibility would curtail the lengthy

system that currently exists. When a particular piece of infrastructure is identified as being in need of repair, the CA soldier would forward that (with the knowledge of his maneuver commander) through his CA chain to the COCOM where the contractor would be contacted and an expert in that area of infrastructure repair would be sent. The COCOMs would have a list of contractors with various specialties who would be prepared to send representatives when requested. So when the maneuver commander at any level asks his CA officer or NCO how long it will be before the power plant, for example, is repaired, the CA soldier has a way to track the status of that contract and can give the maneuver commander a reasonable guess as to when that infrastructure will be functioning again. The CA soldiers also must be able to contract locally for any goods or services, which do not necessarily have to come from outside the area of operations (AO). If the system, which has been identified as needing repair can be repaired by local workers, then the CA soldiers need to have the ability to develop a contract and pay the local labor to make these repairs as soon as possible. According to LTG Wallace the V Corps commander “As soon as we were established in Baghdad, due to our own bureaucracy, the richest country in the world was being outspent by a bunch of thugs.”<sup>1</sup>

Another important aspect of the maneuver force’s situational understanding (SU) is the CMOC. As mentioned previously, CMOC, CIMIC, HACC, or HOC are terms that all refer to a place where IOs, NGOs, and local civilians can meet with the unit occupying a particular area. This forum is where information and ideas are exchanged and assets from one organization can be brought to bear on problems known currently only to a different organization. CMOCs are normally manned by CA personnel. Having CA personnel in a CMOC is certainly appropriate, but the S3 of the unit (regardless of what

level of unit) needs to have SU by way of direct representation in the CMOC. A CMOC may be a very appropriate place for many of the CA functional specialists to frequent or even permanently occupy. According to MAJ Sigfried the 101st Airborne had multiple CMOCs across their AO. These ranged from small field locations to an entire floor of a hotel. MAJ Sigfried said that most of the CA functional specialists assigned to his unit worked in, or at least frequented the large CMOC in the hotel.<sup>2</sup>

There will be one or more O5 or O6 CA officers (FA 39 functional specialists) who will augment the brigade as needed. The specialist augmentee will be an expert in his field. The O5 may be active duty, or he may be a reservist. He will be brought in to fill a specific need. He may be brought from a pool of specialists within the army, or he may be an individual military augmentee (IMA). IMAs are reservists who are not in a reserve unit. They are normally specialists who are mobilized for a specific job. In this case they would be mobilized to oversee the repair or re-generation of a particular system. If there were multiple systems in a division's sector which needed repair, there may be half a dozen CA specialists working on one brigade staff at the same time. They would be in charge of overseeing contracting and reporting to the brigade commander the status of the project. While the CA specialist would not be involved in the legal aspects of the contract, he would verify for the commander what work needed to be done by the contractor, and oversee the project to prevent waste fraud and abuse. Each CA specialist may have several projects across the country, which he is overseeing. While the CA specialist is moving between project sites, the permanently assigned O5 CA officer remains with his brigade to oversee all aspects of CA requirements in his brigade sector. The O3 and O4 AC CA officers would be sent to civilian universities to get masters and

even doctorate degrees in their field to become CA specialists before they reach O5. This could be done in the same way as foreign area officers (FAO). The army sends FAOs to get a masters degree at a civilian university, and then eighteen months to two years of in-country training. They are out of circulation for up to four years. If the army can manage to function without its FAOs for up to four years, they can do without CA specialists for the same amount of time. Even so, some fields are too specialized to expect a career army officer to be able to attain sufficient education to be an expert. For these fields, the IMA specialists would be mobilized. For example, a career army officer with a masters degree in electrical engineering could make a rudimentary assessment as to the status of a damaged power plant, but a true expert may be required to oversee the repair work of that plant. The educational requirements set by USACAPOC(A) would be standardized across the CA community. Since CA soldiers are no longer supposed to run a government ministry, but rather repair a public system, their educational requirements could be standardized much more easily. The subject matter experts would have to be true experts in their field. When speaking to the academic year (AY) 2003-2004 CGSC class, MG Altshuler, Commander USACAPOC(A), used an analogy of a CA specialist who may be in the functional skill specialty of public education. He said that many times the education specialist may turn out to be a kindergarten teacher, for example. MG Altshuler said that although the maneuver element was looking for a specialist to reorganize and reconstruct the local school system, and they wanted a superintendent of schools, that “That kindergarten teacher probably knows more about education than any of your infantrymen.”<sup>3</sup> This may or may not be true, but it is not the point. Under the current organizational constraints if no superintendent of education has volunteered to serve in



the assigned CA unit, the unit has to make do with what it has. This may not always produce the desired effects. The system therefore, needs to be changed. The US is the richest country in the world. Why can it not provide a superintendent of schools, or at least someone with that level of education, where one is needed? These CA specialists need to be the expert in their field that USACAPOC(A) says they are.

When looking to the CA community for subject matter experts, especially the civilian sector, the army should look at the effects desired much as they do in targeting. When the army maneuver commanders look at a specific target, they tell the fires cell what effects they want to achieve on that target. The field artillery, air force and other experts in the fires cell recommend the best method to attack that target to achieve those effects. In the same way, the CA community should recommend to the maneuver commanders the number and type of CA specialists needed to oversee the required projects. The highest level of command in the AO (JSOTF, JTF, CFLCC, Corps, etc.) would send the request through the COCOM to USACAPOC(A). In this way, USACAPOC(A) could send the individual CA specialists needed and not have to mobilize an entire CA unit as they do now.

A list of the capabilities and requirements at each level of command would look something like the following:

OSD: Guidance is given to the COCOMs regarding the strategic policies for a theater. This policy guidance will filter down through the chains of command to the lowest level military organization, with all requisite coordination and oversight, taking place. In the event of war, specific guidance will be given to commanders regarding the

areas in which emphasis is to be placed along with any other specific guidance of which OSD may be aware.

Company: Six school-trained, CA NCOs plus the first sergeant will gather and prioritize in accordance with the aforementioned guidance, assessments in their companies sector. This bottom-up refinement will begin the reconstruction process. Any tactical level intelligence gathered by the CA trained soldiers can and will be used by the commander to plan future missions. This is permissible under title X.

Battalion: The first level of 38/39 series soldiers will be located at battalion. There will be an O4 and an E6 at battalion level who are career field 38/39 soldiers. They will prioritize and refine the assessments done at company level. They will pass the assessments to brigade and advise their commander at battalion of what he can do to affect those systems that have been assessed. The battalion CA officer and NCO can also begin coordinating with any interagency, IO and NGO representatives available, once liaison authority has been granted. Any work that the companies can contract locally can be approved at the battalion level. Any level battalion or higher may operate a CMOC as needed.

Brigade: There is an O4/O5 and an E7 38/39 at the brigade level. They will coordinate all CA activities within the brigade sector. This will ensure that OSDs guidance is followed and that there are no redundancies of effort. Brigade will request CA specialists from the JTF/CFLCC/Corps when one is required by battalion or lower units. They will facilitate interagency coordination and give focus on priority of effort within the brigade sector.

Division: There will be an O5/O6 and an E9 38/39 at division level. They will have a staff sufficient for planning and execution of CA activities within the division. They will provide guidance to the commander and help facilitate coordination with the JTF/CFLCC/Corps and interagency.

JTF/CFLCC/Corps: There will be an O6/O7 and an E9 38/39 at this level. They will have a full staff. Since this is usually the highest level of command in an AO, all anticipated CA specialists will be deployed with this unit. The O7 on this staff will be responsible to the commander to have a fully integrated plan for CA to augment the commander's CMO plan. Upon the commencement of hostilities, the O7 will be responsible for managing all CA activities within the AO. He will coordinate efforts with the COCOM and manage all IO, NGO, and interagency efforts. He will coordinate for additional CA specialists if any are needed, and he will coordinate for contractors that may be needed at any level below his.

COCOM: The COCOM will have a permanently assigned O7 and E9 38/39 who, along with their staff, will manage the theater's CA status during peacetime and plan for any CMO contingencies during war. This staff will be true regional experts. They will make requests to USACAPOC(A) (the force provider) for all specialists who are to be brought into theater, and they are responsible to OSD for contracting, whether it be local or from the US

USACAPOC(A): USACAPOC(A) is the force provider for all CA specialists. They will retain a pool of CA specialists in the sixteen functional specialty fields. There would be as many specialists as required, but an educated guess puts the number at 100 to no more than 200. These specialists will be both AC and RC IMA soldiers. They will be

experts in their field who will spend their time during peacetime working in the various theaters at their specialty, or going to school in the US to learn more and maintain currency in their specialty field. USACAPOC(A) will be responsible for maintaining the standard of the CA specialists so that whatever a unit commander needs, he can get. This will prevent the Public Health specialist who was requested, from arriving only for the unit to find out that rather than a hospital administrator they are getting a pharmaceutical sales representative.

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<sup>1</sup>LTG William Scott Wallace, V Corps Commander during OIF, current commandant of CGSC, interview by author, 13 November 2003, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>2</sup>MAJ Val Sigfried, 101st Airborne G5, telephone interview by author, 31 March 2004.

<sup>3</sup>MG Herbert L. Altshuler, Commander USACAPOC(A), addressing CGSC class academic year 2003-2004, 3 March 2004.

## CHAPTER 5

### COSTS AND BENEFITS

The monetary and manpower benefits of conducting business in the manner described above are astronomical. There would be less than 400 CA soldiers (besides the specialists who would be in the reserves or co-located at Fort Bragg) in the army. The maneuver troops with an additional CA designator would make up the bulk of the overall CA force. Currently, the CSA and other Army leaders are considering re-designating up to nineteen Armor battalions and even more artillery battalions in order to fill many of the shortcomings of our current force structure. One of these shortcomings is the Army's ability to provide sufficient CA support at the battalion level and below in the army. The Army is redundant in its structure with regard to in many of its skill sets. With an army that is smaller and more extended around the globe, it makes sense to reduce the number of soldiers who do the same job and train soldiers to do multiple jobs. For example the CSA is considering changing the aforementioned artillery and armor positions to something else because the air force can provide tactical and operational fires reducing the need for those units. In most cases CA capabilities, (with the exception of the CA specialists on one of the sixteen functional specialty teams), can very easily be replicated by a soldier from a maneuver unit. The US Army cannot afford to have multiple soldiers who are trained to do the same job. Rather, the army needs to have soldiers who are trained to do multiple jobs. If the maneuver forces are allowed to shirk the responsibilities of CMO for any reason, then that causes the command to have to place more American lives in harm's way more times than necessary. It would be preferable to train the maneuver forces who have to be in harm's way anyway to perform the tasks of

CMO. When the maneuver forces are performing security patrols, for example, a CA team could accompany them rather than having to go back to the same area later to obtain information that the security patrol could have gained while they were there. Or with a little training, the maneuver soldiers on the patrol could have gotten the information for the command en lieu of the CA soldiers. As it stands right now, many times the CA soldiers are repeatedly going into hostile territory without sufficient firepower, communications equipment or protection. Oftentimes they are doing this to glean information that the maneuver forces could have given them if the questions had been asked. For all the good the CA forces are doing in OIF and OEF, they could be doing much more, faster and better if they were properly equipped and supported by their maneuver units. The CA forces are encumbered by a system that counts on the RC to resource them and the AC maneuver elements to make up their equipment shortfalls. The CA soldiers should be a force multiplier to the maneuver units. Instead they are doing the lions share of CMO and the maneuver forces are concentrating on security in their sector. CMO would help provide security if the maneuver forces conducted CMO and allowed the CA forces to be that force multiplier that contributed expertise where it was needed and not for CA to be the executors of CMO. The overwhelming consideration must be effects. Based on what CA units actually contribute to CMO, their skills are being mismanaged. That is not implying that CA forces are not doing a superb job in the COE. Nor is that insinuating that the CA units themselves are wasteful. The CA forces are providing a redundancy that the army cannot afford. In today's army the maneuver soldier is already performing many of the tasks of the tactical CA soldier, and this redundancy must be eliminated.

Maneuver units should be responsible for maintaining the CA training of their designated NCOs and officers to USACAPOC(A) standards. The maneuver commander will have first hand knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of his CA forces. This will help build the trust needed to enable the maneuver commander to send his CA forces into harm's way in a decentralized manner as is often required. The CA training would help demonstrate for the maneuver unit what kinds of assets the CA forces would require once engaged. The training benefit for the maneuver soldiers would be greatly multiplied as well, since they would be exposed to CA training while simultaneously conducting their maneuver training. This would give the maneuver forces at the squad and fire team level some exposure to CA considerations prior to a combat deployment. Maneuver units, in all probability, will be performing more SASO in the future, therefore it only stands to reason that they should train for these operations in peacetime.

The two week CA Considerations Course could be added on to ANCOC (Advanced Non-commissioned Officer Course) or BNCOC (Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course) after the initial implementation of this CA force structure. During the initial implementation there may be a need to conduct some MTTs or send some First Sergeants to a special iteration of the school at Fort Bragg. It may be discovered that the CA course needs to be a few weeks long. The AIT for reserve CA soldiers at Fort Bragg is currently twelve weeks long. These are new soldiers, however, who have no knowledge of the Army, much less CA and its intricacies. For somewhat seasoned NCOs, the school could probably be much shorter.

Normally while doing a rotation at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) the maneuver force will encounter some type of civil demonstration or civilian situation

designed to force maneuver elements to consider the civil dynamic. This is a good step in the right direction. The CTCs have been doing this for some time now. What the army has failed to do is follow through the mission beyond simply reaching the SASO environment. The CTCs should not culminate the exercise at what has come to be called “Phase IV”. Rather, the exercise should be Phase four or SASO. Everyone who has been to Afghanistan and Iraq can testify to the wide variety of battlefield situations the next conflict may present, and therefore what the training requirements for those areas are and how the army should be focused. These conflicts serve to show how varied the COE may appear on the next battlefield. Veterans of these conflicts can tell the Army how to prepare training events to better replicate the COE. No army leaders have blinders on and refuse to see the obvious. The problem is finances and time. Army units are not always able to exercise a particular scenario which incorporates SASO. The maneuver forces have a limited amount of time to exercise a specific mission. Also, if the entire training budget is consumed in a SASO rotation to JRTC, the unit may not get to train for the rest of the year in its normal mission. The maneuver commander chooses his mission, but if there are tasks in which he knows that his battalion needs more training, he may forgo the CA portion. In the COE the CTCs should run exercises in which the entire mission is SASO. If the maneuver commander owned his CA forces as in the stated recommendation, he could plan and then execute a SASO in which the entire focus of his training was stabilization and security. This could be done much more economically if the maneuver commander’s own forces had CA designators rather than trying to integrate an RC CA unit.



This recommendation solves most, if not all, of the training distracters currently experienced between maneuver and CA forces by allowing the CA elements to train every time the maneuver elements train. There would be no problems with mobilization or equipment transportation since the CA forces and their equipment are a part of the maneuver unit already. The maneuver commanders at all levels would have the opportunity to be advised constantly on the civilian populace, and not just at a nightly or daily briefing. The soldiers at all levels would have the opportunity to train alongside the CA soldiers and learn more about the considerations of CA. Of course CTC (Combat Training Center) rotations would still have a primary emphasis and that emphasis may or may not be CA. If the emphasis for a particular rotation is not a CA focus, then the maneuver soldiers still get the opportunity to learn from each other and the considerations of CA are not forgotten.

Most of the same considerations mentioned regarding training are true of planning as well. Beyond the logistical simplifications, however, there is also the added benefit of shaping the maneuver plan to ease the stress of post hostilities operations. The full impact of this aspect of the recommendation may be intangible, but is undoubtedly of immeasurable importance. The impact is intangible because CA forces have so often not had the opportunity to be included in the initial planning process. It is not possible to know how the plan would have been executed differently had they had input at the conception of the plan. Since most war plans are written long before they are actually needed and then only updated as technology, political sensitivities and/or specific mission requirements change, CA considerations are never factored into the plan until the final stages of preparing to go to war. If CA issues are considered, they may have changed by

the time a particular war plan is needed. During the cold war, for example, the military goal was to defend US interests from an aggressor. These plans did not include rebuilding the enemies' country after the war. Due to this, there is no consideration for the long-term use of American soldiers as peacekeepers in most war plans. Had CA issues been addressed earlier in OIF, perhaps the campaign would have been carried out slightly differently. Perhaps the campaign would not have been altered at all, that is why many CA considerations are intangible. Whether OIF would have been conducted differently or not, according to after actions review (AAR) comments (listed above) from some of the first units into Iraq, there was a need for CA planners at a much earlier time in the planning and deployment cycle. These planning problems are not an issue using the recommended changes. If the CA forces were a part of the maneuver element, the planning would take place conjunctively between CA forces and maneuver forces.

The relationship between CA forces and maneuver forces achieved in the proposed recommendation also lends itself to better planning by virtue of familiarity with the unit's personnel and capabilities. Besides unit SOPs and TTPs, the interpersonal relationships normally exhibited amongst maneuver soldiers would allow for a more integrated CMO plan than the augmentee relationship currently used. This would also facilitate a higher level of trust, which in turn would allow more freedom of movement for the CA mission.

### Current Proposals

The following slides are a portion of a brief created and distributed by USACAPOC(A)(A). They outline the plan USACAPOC(A)(A) has for CA in the army. This plan has not yet been adopted. USACAPOC(A)(A) has failed to answer the

question, Specifically, what will all of these forces do? This is a recurrent problem when addressing CA forces because many people in positions to affect the future force structure and capability do not know specifically what CA forces do right now. Through very little fault of their own, CA forces have been required to do tasks that are redundant, dangerous and for which they are ill equipped and prepared. Many times the CA soldier is risking his life to acquire information that the maneuver soldiers already have, or could easily get, while they conduct their normal missions. If a maneuver commander asks a soldier to complete a mission, the soldier will invariably do his best to complete that mission. In the case of CA, many maneuver commanders do not consider the effects that his CA forces will have on his AO, and that there may be a far more economical way to do what he is sending that CA soldier to do. CA is a separate element over which the maneuver commander exercises very little control. The USACAPOC(A)(A) proposal does not place the onus of CMO on the maneuver commander where it should be, but rather continues to exacerbate the problem of separate missions for the maneuver commander and his CA element.

There are changes to doctrine contained in the brief, which are not addressed. That is to say that the force structure changes require doctrinal changes that have not yet been made. The slide presentation appears in its entirety in appendix A. The following excerpts and comments represent the problem areas of greatest magnitude.

The USACAPOC(A)(A) slide will appear first (abbreviated into text form), then comments on the particular aspect of the presentation which could be better served by the recommendation.<sup>1</sup>

## Vision

Seamlessly integrating Active Army and Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers and units who are capable, organized, trained to standard, equipped and validated; highly motivated and well led; ready, relevant, responsive, and reliable across the full spectrum of military operations in peace and war; living personal and professional standards of excellence towards which all others aspire.

## Vision Slide Comments

The vision described by Major General Altshuler can easily be realized by the recommendation put forward above. In fact it can be far more easily realized by the recommendation than by expanding the current CA force structure. “Seamlessly integrated AC and RC CA soldiers. . . .” would be a far simpler task if the soldiers all belonged to the maneuver unit. At the battalion and above there would be CA soldiers who were not performing CA as an additional duty. However, for the soldiers below the battalion level, this additional duty cannot be performed until their primary task (defeating the enemy) has been completed anyway. Also, maneuver forces have to accompany CA soldiers on their CA mission when it is in a denied area, so it is only economic use of forces to have them trained to conduct the mission and not have the redundancy of troops.

## Location

This slide depicts over fifty unit garrison locations (home stations) in the continental US.

## Location Slide Comments

As for the geographic dispersion of individuals, it would be far easier to consolidate a group of IMAs than a group of CA units. The numbers of CA specialists

that were in the RC would vary depending on the requirements and the number of people who were willing to volunteer for these positions. Eventually there would be sufficient expertise within the army to alleviate the need for very many RC CA specialists. As the education programs prescribed by the above recommendation were implemented and completed, there would be less and less need for soldiers from the RC. Only those specialties that were very technical, and not normally performed by the army, would still need to be brought in from the outside. If no one with civilian expertise could be found who was willing to volunteer for duty, then that particular specialty would have to be contracted.

#### CA Planning Associations

This slide graphically depicts the regional orientations of the four CACOMs: 350, SOUTHCOM; 351, PACOM; 352, CENTCOM; and 353, EUCOM.

#### CA Planning Associations Slide Comments

The regional orientations of the CA officers and NCOs could remain the same as they are now. There would be much more overlap between CA soldiers with various regional orientations, however, since there would not be a CACOM structure to align with the COCOM. There would be a habitual relationship with a COCOM based on the unit to which the CA soldier was assigned. So a CA soldier assigned to 3ID would probably have a CENTCOM regional focus. A CA soldier assigned to 25ID would probably have a PACOM focus. There would be much overlap due to the many units who are not regionally aligned at all, like the 101st Airborne or the 82nd Airborne Divisions for example. It is more important for a soldier to have training in regional and cultural

awareness than it is to have extensive training in one particular culture. If a soldier has some regional orientation training in a particular region, he at least will understand that whatever unfamiliar culture he is working with is far different from his own. He will have the experiences of his training region to draw from and know what questions to ask when dealing with this new culture. If the plan to stabilize soldiers for seven years comes to fruition, soldiers will have the opportunity to learn quite a bit about their new AO.

#### Assigned Strength

RC CA has 6,220 soldiers assigned, and AC CA has 294 soldiers assigned.

(These numbers are subject to change slightly with each RC unit manning report.)

#### Assigned Strength Slide Comments

There are currently 6,220 RC CA soldiers before the USACAPOC(A) proposal. There would be no more than 100 RC CA soldiers under the recommendation. There would be less than 500 AC CA soldiers under the recommendation. That is based on one officer and one NCO at the battalion level and one officer and one NCO at the brigade level. CA would be their only job. The bulk of the CA work on the ground would be performed by the maneuver soldiers with the additional skill identifier. There would be less than 200 RC CA soldiers under the recommendation. The tasks currently being done by CA forces would still be performed. There would be far less wasted energy due to redundancy. The 6,220 CA soldiers currently assigned to RC CA units would be replaced by the 3,500 CA soldiers in the recommendation. This is rough scoping, but the numeric difference is apparent. This number is derived by seven maneuver soldiers per company, two CA soldiers per battalion, two to five CA soldiers per brigade and a full staff of CA

soldiers at division and above. These soldiers would be already assigned to the units, so resourcing would not be a problem. Only the CA specialists would not be assigned to maneuver units on a permanent basis.

Currently (and in the future plan for CA) the CA soldiers below brigade level have no language training, specialization training or cultural training. Specialization training refers to the sixteen functional specialty fields. These are echeloned to the CA Brigade, which supports a maneuver Corps. They bring less to the maneuver unit than would one of the maneuver soldiers with some level of CA training. The recommendation is a far more economic use of human resources. Currently, only at the brigade level and above are the functional teams found. These functional teams may or may not have the proper training for the tasks they are assigned. For the sake of argument, assume that the functional teams at the maneuver brigade level do have the requisite number of personnel with the training and expertise that they are supposed to have. They are still designed to run a government ministry, which is to say that they are supposed to bring the skill sets required to provide particular services for the populace. CA units do not have sufficient numbers of people to perform these tasks. They are not prepared to perform the tasks that the maneuver units expect of them. This problem is exacerbated by maneuver units, which do not have a clear picture of the purpose, capabilities and limitations of their assigned CA unit. The result is a large CA element with very little direction and purpose.

#### New Mission Statement

To provide the combatant commander the capability to engage the civil component of the operational environment . . . using integrated effects-based capabilities in joint, interagency, and multinational operations that are planned, executed, and transitioned by CA specialists to mitigate or defeat threats to civil

society and assist in establishing the capability for deterring or defeating those threats in the future.

#### New Mission Statement Slide Comments

In the new and old mission statements, the recommendation allows the COCOM to engage the civil-military component with all of the assets at the COCOM's disposal. The recommendation provides more visibility to the maneuver commanders than the proposal by USACAPOC(A). At the lowest levels the maneuver commanders are the assets with the situational awareness who need to be guiding the CMO. As was mentioned above in the AAR by CPT Morgan, the company commanders should not take for gospel a CMO plan developed at echelons above his level. At the maneuver brigade level the staff does not have as much contact with the populace as the maneuver squad leader. Therefore, the plan for reconstruction developed at that level to be executed at the company level should have bottom up refinement. The CMO plan should fit each maneuver unit's area. This individualization can be accomplished with some area refinement by the companies and battalions. The upper levels of command should coordinate, consolidate and direct the company and battalion level units to provide guidance and prevent wasted or redundant work. They should also give guidance as to the theater level plan. This does not require the upper level staffs to develop a specific plan for the maneuver level. If this is the case, there is not a requirement for the number of O5s and O6s in the upper level of CA command structure that currently exists.

#### CA Operations

Conducted through, with and by US and allied military forces, indigenous populations, US government agencies, international organizations, and other non-governmental organizations. Using three logical Lines of Operations (activities):



- 1 Humanitarian Assistance/Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HA/HCA)
  - 2 Population and Resources Control (PRC)'
  - 3 Support to Civil Administration (SCA)
- Planned, Executed, and Transitioned by:
- 1 CA Planning Teams
  - 2 CA Functional Specialists
  - 3 Civil Military Operations Command (CMOC)
  - 4 CA Teams (CAT)

#### CA Operations Slide Comments

According to the tasks represented in this slide, there is nothing gained by using CA forces instead of trained maneuver forces to most economically accomplish the stated tasks of CA. The number of soldiers required to perform the stated tasks of CA according to the proposal is not an economic use of forces. According to the USACAPOC(A) proposal, the tactical level soldiers are going to execute plans made at the brigade and division level, which are planned by functional specialists augmenting that level of command. The plan will be disseminated from the brigade (for example) to the lower elements who will execute that plan using their organic troops and OPCON CA assets. The battalion level CA assets may have visibility of the plan before the maneuver forces do in order to provide input from the company level. If not, then there is very little input from the company level and below. How much input the maneuver force has is very important since they are the forces, which have a finger on the pulse of the community. If company level input is going to be provided by the maneuver forces, it is a redundancy to have CA forces at battalion in the first place. It is very redundant to have CA forces involved in the scenario at all beyond advising the maneuver commander on how to best employ his forces. CMO is still the responsibility of the maneuver commander. So this planning team at the brigade level is probably of degraded value to the brigade S3. If they are truly experts in their field in the civilian sector they are not going to have the time to

stay current on US Army doctrine. If they are not current on doctrine, SOPs, and TTPs, then they are of very little value to a planning staff. This entire idea of using civilians who are in the RC because the army cannot maintain a professional soldier's level of training to that of his civilian counterpart is based on the World War II doctrine in which the CA specialist was going to perform the functions of a segment of the government. As has already been mentioned several times, that is not what CA forces do today. If the CA planning teams are not integrally involved at the company and platoon level to be able to provide adequate feedback to the commander based on what the maneuver force says is happening on the ground, then they are not effective in future plans. If the CA planning teams are not proficient in the SOPs and TTPs of the unit, their advise to the commander is going to be of less value. A maneuver planner with some CA training at the tactical level is more efficient than an entire staff of RC CA soldiers in their current configuration. The question is still, What does the asset provide? and Could the same effects be obtained at a lower cost to the army? If being more efficient with military assets is a goal of transformation, there is a need for more support at the tactical (platoon and company) level and less at the brigade and battalion level. The slots being taken up by that CA planning team would be better served to be an extra infantryman in the platoon with some CA training. All military forces have to answer the question honestly, What contribution does this asset provide to the mission? And a similar question, Is this asset's contribution worth what it costs the Army?

The army needs CA specialists, and many of their skills will still have to reside in the RC. The current and proposed method by which they are used, however, is redundant and inefficient. CA specialists (both RC and AC) should only be assigned at the highest

level of command in the AO. They should not be employed below brigade level. They should employ their skills to repair or manage the repair of a problem and not be a full time adviser to the brigade or below commander or his staff. There are CA generalists who can do that. Anyone with some basic knowledge of both the system and the commander's intent for the AO or project can give input to the plan. The CA specialist is there temporarily to give specific insight for the repair of a particular piece of infrastructure or system, and perhaps to manage the execution of the particular repair mission: a mission, which by the way, will probably not be performed by the army.

### Civil Affairs Structure

For the specifics of where the growth of CA units will take place, see annex A. Generally, the numbers are as follows: CACOM will increase by sixty-five soldiers, brigades will increase by seventy-three soldiers and battalions will increase by thirty-six soldiers. The battalions' numbers include the companies. The place where maneuver forces say they need the most CA soldiers, at the battalion and below, is where the growth is the least.

### Civil Affairs Structure Slide Comments

Slides twenty-four through twenty-nine all indicate growth within the CA community. They also indicate changes in the MTOE and doctrine of CA. These MTOE and doctrine changes have second and third order effects that are not taken into account. For example, what training will the new 38 series soldiers have? It will not be comparable to the 18 series soldiers, which they will replace out of the AC. There is neither time nor money to train that many soldiers to that level of proficiency. That alone

will change the way AC CA forces can be used. Further, the doctrine around which the growth is built is almost fifty years old. It is predicated on CA functioning as a government ministry. This is no longer the function of CA.

#### Civil Affairs Growth Rationale

1. Army Transformation
2. Standardization of forces
3. Directed by SECDEF to rebalance the force
4. Standardization of Capability (AC/RC)
5. No upfront costs to USASOC, minimal P-11 sustainment cost
6. Willingness of USARC/OCAR to grow CA and PSYOP
7. Requirement for greater self-sufficiency

#### Civil Affairs Growth Rationale Slide Comments

The transformation of the military is designed around effects. The desired effects determine force requirements and therefore force structure changes. The basic question still remains, What will these force structure changes provide the maneuver commander? It appears that the changes will produce only more layers of bureaucracy for the maneuver commander to endure. The growth of CA and the desire to be more self-sufficient enables the CA mission to become separated from the maneuver commander's mission. The separation of the CA mission from the maneuver commander's mission allows for less direct involvement and oversight by the maneuver commander. This is counterproductive to good efficiency. According to MAJ Don Gardiner, of the 308th CA Brigade, "If I were king for a day, I would get rid of either the CA Brigades or the

CACOMs (to much C2). All you need are CA Battalions to support maneuver units and some level of C2 above them, NOT two layers of C2 above them. This would put more functional teams in the field, and help to better support combat commanders.”<sup>2</sup>

### Conclusion

1. Proposed CA growth aligns with the Future Force concepts
2. The proposed force structure adds capability, not overhead
3. Standardization of CA forces
4. Proposed RC force structure increase enables the command to comply with

SECDEF’s Rebalance goal

5. Proposed AC growth provides short notice CA support to the Regional

Combatant Commanders

6. CMF-38 (career management field)

### Conclusion Slide Comments

In the conclusion slide it appears that USACAPOC(A) has addressed the symptoms of the Army’s CA shortfall without addressing the problem. Most maneuver commanders are asking for more CA troops, but that may not be what they really need. To address desired battlefield effects, first the task of CA forces must be decided. If CA forces are not supposed to perform the bulk of CMO, then more forces are not necessarily needed. If CA forces are to perform the bulk of CMO, then far more forces are needed than the USACAPOC(A) proposal allows. CA forces are supposed to advise the maneuver commander on the best way to use his forces and conduct operations in his area. This is not what they are being asked to do. A reorganization is needed in CA, but

not necessarily overall growth. The second bullet on the conclusions slide is exactly backwards. More capabilities are not being gained, only more overhead.

### Conclusion

How has CA managed to avoid a significant doctrinal update for over fifty years? The following is the abbreviated evolution of CA doctrine. The original requirements for CA were properly identified, manned, equipped and funded. As the old adage goes, “If it’s not broke, don’t fix it”. The structure of CA served the Army well during World War II, and therefore there was no reason to change that structure. During the Korean conflict, the need for CA soldiers was still there, but there was now a legitimate government with which the US was working. The CA soldiers were performing some of their World War II functions, but not that of acting as the government. Also, after the demobilization at the end of World War II, there were only a fraction of the 6000 some-odd school trained CA officers from World War II remaining in the Army. Not knowing what the future held, and since it was only four years since the governing responsibilities had been fully returned to Germany and Japan, it was prudent not to change the doctrine of CA which had served the Army so well during the crucial period right after World War II. During the Viet Nam era the same situation occurred where there was an official government with which the Army was working. Once again the US Army was not performing the duties of the official Vietnamese Government. They were conducting many of the CA activities which supported that government, but not ever acting as the government for a region per se. Since the end of US involvement in Viet Nam the US Army has not been large enough to support the functions of World War II CA doctrine. The Army has not performed those tasks for several reasons. Not only does the US Army not have sufficient

manpower to act as a foreign government, but in accordance with the definitions articulated in the Geneva Convention and international law, it is arguable that the US Army has not been an occupying force since World War II. There was some debate as to whether or not the US was, and is, an occupying force in Iraq. But even if the US fits the description of an occupying force, there is simply not enough manpower to perform those functions. In order to act as a government, the army has to provide the people with a myriad of things such as security, for example. In order to do that mission there would have to be a court system in place for offenders, soldiers would need to act as policemen and there would be a requirement for jails, prisons and detention centers. Also, the reason for going to war was to remove a dangerous regime from power. The US Army wants to turn that power back to the Iraqi people as soon as possible. If the Army took responsibility for the functions of government, that transition of power to the people would be infinitely slower. While the functional specialty skills in CA were developed to run government ministries, and they perform the functions of advising the maneuver commander on the same, the specialists are too few, and ill prepared, to actually act as a government.

There will still be a place for a separate AC CA unit like the 96th CA Battalion. It will serve to perform CA functions whenever it may not be appropriate to deploy a maneuver unit. The use of the 96th will have to be judicious and appropriate. They are a very limited resource. The 96th CA Battalion in concert with the recommended pool of specialists may be able to give maneuver elements a significant head start when entering a potentially hostile area.

CA forces have become the interface for the civil populace in a war zone. The maneuver commanders in the US Army do not want to perform CMO if they do not have to. It goes against their culture, it is dangerous, ambiguous and most of all not romantic. It is much preferred to allow CA forces to do the CMO tasks in order to allow the maneuver forces to “close with and destroy the enemy”. Up until OEF, CA was relegated to a support relationship in which the conventional maneuver forces did not have to concern themselves with CMO as long as CA forces were doing their job. Since September 11, however, the conventional forces have seen the need to learn more about CA, that they may use them more wisely. USASOC, and specifically SF, has found a force multiplier in CA. The ODAs can concentrate on training the indigenous force and war fighting, and they have a surrogate force that they may use as a supplementary force to pacify the local populace and win the hearts and minds. Conventional commanders largely do not understand SOF and are just now seeing the need to combine their efforts with SOF. They oftentimes still want to use them for SOF missions without ever having learned their capabilities and limitations. This was obvious in Afghanistan by a story that was largely circulated throughout SOCCENT (CENTCOMs Special Operations Cell) that General Tommy Franks asked his SOF advisor, How many brigades of these SF guys do we have? He was amazed when the answer he got was, one, sir. The same story reoccurred in Iraq. When asked what LTG Wallace expected of his CA forces going into the war, he replied, “I really didn’t know what they were supposed to be doing anyway, so I didn’t have any preconceived expectations.”<sup>3</sup> Now in the GWOT, the conventional, maneuver army has seen the special skills that CA can provide, and they desperately need them. They are largely ignorant of CA and thus, use the P for plenty principle, which



says, just send as many of them as are available. This provides the opportunity for a misuse of a valuable asset, which is exactly what has occurred. Active duty SOF soldiers have a voice at the COCOM through their TSOC (theater special operations command), a permanent part of the COCOM staff, and to the JTF through their SOCCE (special operations command and control element). The RC CA soldiers do not have that mediator with the conventional forces to whom they are assigned. The more CA soldiers the maneuver commander has at his disposal, the more he can distance himself from his responsibilities of CMO. According to the 101st Airborne Division's G5, they learned the value of their tactical level CA soldiers early on and soon "the entire division became CA soldiers." They were practicing the principles prescribed in the recommendation without having the structural changes yet made.<sup>4</sup> As for the CA forces themselves, they have been doing an incredible amount of work in every conflict since World War II. They have done most of it out of sight of the mainstream army, however. CA forces have, therefore, remained basically doctrinally unchanged for over fifty years.

In the COE, in an army in the midst of transformation, it is time to bring the majority of CA forces into the AC and use them like the valuable and limited force multiplier that they are. Today the US Army has to use all of its assets in the most economic and common sense means possible. The army cannot afford to be parochial, nor resistant to change. Change must occur at the speed of the modern battlefield.

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<sup>1</sup>USACAPOC(A), "Way Ahead," slide presentation on the future of Civil Affairs, 24 January 2004.

<sup>2</sup>MAJ Don Gardiner, operations officer for 411th CA battalion, interview by author, e-mail, 6 April 2004.

<sup>3</sup>LTG William Scott Wallace, Commander US Army's V Corps, Operation Iraqi Freedom, currently commandant of CGSC, Fort Leavenworth KS, interview by author, at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 November 2003.

<sup>4</sup>MAJ Val Sigfried, 101st Airborne G5, interview by author, telephone, 31 March 2004.


## USACAPOC(A) WAY AHEAD PRESENTATION (SELECTED SLIDES)




**HERBERT L. ALTSHULER**  
Major General, United States Army  
Commanding

[illegible]

# Civil Affairs Planning Associations



AS OF: 13 Aug 03



	Strength (Assigned)	Percent	Percent of Command
Civil Affairs (USAR)	6,220	59%	85%
Psychological Operations (USAR)	2,781	26%	
Psychological Operations (AC)	1,311	12%	15%
Civil Affairs (AC)	294	3%	

# Civil Affairs Mission

**To provide the combatant commander the capability to engage the civil component of the operational environment . . .**


**. . . using integrated effects-based capabilities in Joint, Inter-agency, and Multi-national operations that are planned, executed, and transitioned by CA specialists to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and assist in establishing the capability for deterring or defeating those threats in the future.**

FM 3-05.4 (draft)  
FM 41-10 (replacement)


## CA Operations

- Conducted *through, with, and by* U.S. and allied military forces, indigenous populations, U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and other non-governmental organizations.
- Using three *logical* Lines of Operations (activities):
  - Humanitarian Assistance/Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HA/HCA)
  - Population and Resources Control (PRC)
  - Support to Civil Administration (SCA)
- Planned, Executed, and Transitioned by:
  - CA Planning Teams
  - CA Functional Specialists
  - Civil Military Operations Command (CMOC)
  - CA Teams (CAT)


## CACOM STRUCTURE



## CA BDE STRUCTURE




## Tactical CA Battalion



## Active Component Civil Affairs

(Proposed)



## RC Growth Rationale

- **Army Transformation**
  - Future Force UA/UE restructure
- **Standardization of forces**
  - CA Company standardization (size)
- **Directed by SECDEF to “rebalance the force”**
- **Standardization of Capability (AC/RC)**
  - Organic communication
  - Additional tactical assets
  - CMCC
  - CMF-38 (AC and RC)
- **No upfront cost to USASOC, minimal P-11 sustainment cost**
- **Willingness of USARC/OCAR to grow CA and PSYOP**
- **Requirement for greater self sufficiency**
  - commo
  - CS/CSS

## Conclusion

- **Proposed CA growth aligns with the Future Force concepts:**
  - Battalion growth complements Conventional Division reorganization
- **The proposed force structure adds capability, not overhead**
  - Ability to rotate AC CA battalions for longterm support
- **Standardization of CA forces**
  - CA company is same structure, both RC and AC
  - Standardization of RC CA Battalion (28 tactical battalions)
  - Standardization of BDE and BN capabilities, both AC and RC (less functional specialty capability)
- **Proposed RC force structure increase enables the command to comply with SECDEF's Rebalance goal**
  - Additional tactical assets
- **Proposed AC growth provides short notice CA support to the Regional Combatant Commanders**  
**CMF-38**
  - CA trained personnel in BN through Joint level CA assignments
  - Standardization of training/capabilities in AC and RC
  - Career path for AC CA soldiers



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